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Introduction 
 
 Compliance with fisheries regulations is in part, complicated as a result of the 
current resource allocation regime between the federal government and the individual 
states. Maritime boundaries delimit areas of state waters extending a certain distance 
offshore with the remainder under federal control. Fisheries are managed with respect to 
these separate jurisdictions and while state and federal interactions have led to various 
combinations of authority with respect to management plans, authority over a fishery is 
generally vested according to territorial sovereignty. Consequently, cognizance of 
differing state and federal regulations and their applicable locales is of particular 
importance to fishing vessel operators. A striped bass in state waters remains blissfully 
unaware of its new federal designation after crossing an invisible line drawn over the 
water, but a fisherman in pursuit who remains unaware soon runs afoul of federal 
enforcement. 
 This paper examines state and federal fisheries jurisdictions in the context of 
regulatory compliance in areas of complex maritime territorial boundaries. That both 
states and the federal government independently regulate their fisheries is uncontroversial 
for states with relatively featureless coastlines. In those instances, the boundary between 
the two territories is a relatively straight line posing little risk for accidental or necessary 
transit. Complex coastlines however, whether the result of deep coastal indentations or 
offshore islands, isolate pockets of territory and create ample opportunity for a fishing 
vessel operator to run afoul of incongruent state and federal regulations. For example, 
Block Island sits more than six miles off the Rhode Island mainland. Because the state 
has a three-mile territorial sea, the placement results in two areas of Rhode Island waters, 
one wholly removed from the other by a narrow band of federal territory. Block Island’s 
popularity among the fishing community combined with its sequestered nature makes 
Block Island Sound an apt case study of the problems arising from a regime comprised of 
dual state and federal fisheries jurisdictions. 
 Part I of this paper considers the issue of a federally licensed
1
 fishing vessel 
transiting a state’s territorial waters. That this occurs is unsurprising considering the 
necessity of returning to port to offload the catch. However, state regulations pertaining 
to the catch on board are often more restrictive than their federal counterparts. The 
question becomes whether the transit of state waters is legal when the catch on board 
does not satisfy these more restrictive regulations. The answer is in the negative, as 
federal fisheries regulations do not preempt those of the state unless the vessel is 
unregistered in the state and fished wholly outside its waters. The same vessel now 
transiting state waters to reach adjacent federal waters encounters fewer roadblocks; state 
transit provisions allow the vessel to proceed provided gear remains stowed and passage 
is continuous and expeditious. 
                                                        
1
 Note that there is no federal “fishing license.” Permits are sought a per species basis, 
sometimes including multiple species of similar characteristics. To effectuate a general 
discussion, “licensed” will refer to a vessel with the necessary permit. 
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 Part II examines the less frequent issue of a state licensed
2
 vessel transiting 
federal waters. Few state licensed vessels could ever have legitimate purpose to venture 
seaward into federal waters but on occasion, offshore islands create “bubbles” of state 
waters within which the vessels may fish. The issue becomes the legality of the return trip 
across federal waters. The result is bifurcated; commercial vessels are barred from 
returning while recreational vessels may transit the federal waters under certain 
conditions. The commercial vessel is barred as a result of strict federal commercial 
permit requirements. The reverse of the “most restrictive rule” in Part I governs 
recreational vessels. Lacking the strict requirements, the recreational vessel may transit 
federal waters provided that the catch on board satisfies federal regulations more 
restrictive than those of the state.  
 Part III discusses the ability of a state to exercise fisheries jurisdiction over a 
portion of federal waters to alleviate the incongruous fisheries management schemes 
described in Part II. Massachusetts exercises fisheries jurisdiction over the federal waters 
within Nantucket Sound under the justification that state management of fisheries in 
federal waters is proper where state waters nearly or totally encompass federal waters. 
This part discusses whether the application of this rule could extend to Block Island 
Sound and concludes that while the geography is dissimilar, the problems raised are 
worse, offering a more compelling reason to extend jurisdiction. While legislation could 
provide for transit on a species-specific basis, a total extension of jurisdiction would be 
more efficient. 
 Part IV describes a broader solution to fisheries problems; state annexation of 
federal territory. While Massachusetts solved its fisheries issues in Nantucket sound 
through an extension of fisheries jurisdiction, New York accomplished the same in Long 
Island Sound through an extension of sovereignty. The issue here is whether Rhode 
Island could classify Block Island Sound as the state’s internal waters, eliminating the 
problematic federal waters. While Block Island Sound possesses all the necessary 
characteristics of a “juridical bay,” the Supreme Court previously held that the while 
Long Island Sound is a bay, Block Island Sound is not.
3
 Rhode Island’s burden is to show 
that the Court’s subsidiary tests for defining a bay are unnecessary and arbitrary in light 
of current treaty law. 
 
I. Federal Permit – State Waters  
 
 A fishing vessel operating under a federal permit may legally transit state waters 
in order to return to port or reach adjacent waters. To return to port, the vessel must abide 
by any state regulation more restrictive than those applicable to federal fisheries.  If 
merely seeking adjacent federal waters, the vessel may proceed in accordance with state 
mandated transit requirements. At issue in this part are the legal justifications for 
subjecting a federally licensed vessel to state law rather than acknowledging the 
supremacy of federal law and preempting state fisheries regulations. 
                                                        
2
 State saltwater fishing licenses generally cover a broad array of species. 
3
 See U.S. v. Maine (The Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504 
(1985). 
 
4 
 
State control over coastal waters is a product of a settlement between the 
individual states and the federal government. The resulting regime grants the territory a 
certain distance offshore to the individual states with the remainder left to the federal 
government. Specifically, states retain jurisdiction over the waters and marine resources 
three nautical miles beyond their coastlines under the Submerged Lands Act and the 
Outer Continental Shelf Act.
4
 This system of allocating marine resources between the 
federal government and coastal states provides the basis for state and federal fisheries 
management. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
(“Magnuson Act”) grants the United States control over fishing activities and fishery 
resources within its waters.
5
 Specifically, the United States exerts regulatory and 
enforcement powers over a radius extending 200 miles from the coastline.
6
 With respect 
to the settlement between the federal government and the states, the landward boundary 
of the area "[for the purpose] of applying [the Magnuson Act]… is a line coterminous 
with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal States.”7 In further deference to the 
states, the Magnuson Act also states, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending 
or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any State within its boundaries.”8  
Neither § 1802(11) nor § 1856(a)(1) explicitly provides individual States 
authority over federally licensed vessels but Congressional hearings on the authorization 
of the Magnuson Act suggest that this was the result intended: 
 
Under United States law, the biological resources within the territorial sea 
of the United States are the management responsibility of the adjacent 
several States of the Union. Whatever regulation of both fishermen and 
fish harvest, what occurs in this area is as deemed necessary and 
appropriate by each concerned State.
9
 
 
Taken together, the intent and language of the Magnuson Act suggest that a state does 
have regulatory authority over any fishing vessels that enter its waters. In plain evidence 
of this interpretation, the language of the “most restrictive rule” appears in many federal 
fisheries regulations.
10
 
 Opponents of the most restrictive rule argue that possession of a federal permit 
allows a fishing vessel to disregard state management measures given the supremacy of 
                                                        
4
 Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953). 
5
 16 U.S.C.S §§ 1801 et seq. (LexisNexis 2013). 
6
 16 U.S.C.S §§ 1853(c); 1855(d) (LexisNexis 2013). 
7
 16 U.S.C.S § 1802(11) (LexisNexis 2013). 
8
 16 U.S.C.S. § 1856(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2013). 
9
 H.R. Rep. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 29 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
593, 602. 
10
 50 C.F.R. § 648.3 (2013) (Relation to Other Laws; Fisheries of the Northeastern United 
States); (Nothing in these regulations supersedes more restrictive state management 
measures for any of the species referenced in § 648.1 and, for Atlantic salmon, more 
restrictive local management measures). 
5 
 
federal law and that consequently, federal fisheries regulations preempt those of the state. 
Based on the language of the Magnuson Act, its legislative history, and 
acknowledgement within federal regulations, it would appear settled that there is no 
federal-state conflict. However, courts disagree whether the Magnuson Act and its 
implementing regulations preempt state fisheries law.
11
 
Rhode Island courts do hold that the Magnuson Act preempts state fisheries 
regulations in certain situations. For instance in State v. Sterling, a Rhode Island 
regulation established a catch limit of yellowtail flounder landed at Rhode Island ports or 
possessed in Rhode Island territorial waters regardless of origin.
12
 State environmental 
police found the defendant fishing vessel operator in excess of the limit, who argued that 
the regulation conflicted with federal law.
13
 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that 
through the Magnuson Act, Congress preempted the states where federal regulations 
existed for specific species.
14
 In this instance, federal regulations governing the fishing of 
yellowtail flounder were in effect, thereby barring the state from indirectly regulating the 
species outside its boundaries.
15
  
The apparent contradiction between the Sterling decision and the Magnuson Act 
arises from the court’s reading of 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)(3), which explains the limited 
circumstances a state can regulate a vessel outside of its waters.
16
 The court then applied 
these requirements for extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulation of all vessels within its 
waters, citing the indirect effect this has on a vessel’s activities outside of them. This is 
likely a misreading of the statute, as § 1856(a) states that, “nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any State within its 
boundaries.” The explicit “nothing in this chapter” appears to indicate that any court’s 
construction that another provision in fact does diminish the authority of the state to 
regulate vessels entering its waters is entirely untenable. Moreover, the Sterling court’s 
interpretation also would severely restrict a state's authority to regulate fishing off its 
waters, contrary to the express purpose of the Magnuson Act.
17
 
Raffield v. State espouses the more common reading of the law: that a vessel 
submits to the state's jurisdiction by docking within its territorial limits.
18
 There, a fish 
processor violated a Florida statute barring possession of redfish caught with a purse 
                                                        
11
 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Preemption of State and Local Regulations by 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 to 1883), 
31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 337 (2008). 
12
 448 A.2d 785, 786 (R.I.1982). 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. at 787.   
15
 Id. 
16
 A State may regulate a fishing vessel outside the boundaries of the State in the 
following circumstances: (A) The fishing vessel is registered under the law of that State, 
and (i) there is no fishery management plan or other applicable Federal fishing 
regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating; or (ii) the State’s laws and 
regulations are consistent with the fishery management plan and applicable Federal 
fishing regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating. 
17
 16 U.S.C.S § 1801(b) (LexisNexis 2013). 
18
 565 So. 2d 704 (F.L 1990). 
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seine.
19
 The processor possessed a federal permit to catch red fish in federal waters in the 
Gulf of Mexico and argued that federal law preempted the federal statute.
20
 The court 
noted that by their own language, the federal regulations pertaining to red drum expressly 
encouraged more restrictive state regulation.
21
 The rules’ preamble stated: 
 
It is the intent of the Secretary to supplement the States' efforts to conserve 
red drum. Therefore, the emergency rule does not supersede any State 
landing laws which apply to red drum.
22
 
 
In concurrence with the statement of intent, the actual federal rules for red drum 
provided: 
 
(a) Persons affected by these regulations should be aware that other 
Federal and State statutes and regulations may apply to their 
activities…(d) These regulations will not be construed to supersede any 
State law which prohibits the landing or possession within the jurisdiction 
of that State of any red drum.
23
 
 
That federal regulations constitute a floor, not a ceiling to state fisheries regulations and 
as such do not preempt state regulations is the view of the First Circuit. In Davrod Corp. 
v. Coates, a Massachusetts regulation set a catch limit for the amount squid a “freezer 
boat” could process and barred vessels with a length greater than 90 feet from fishing in 
Massachusetts waters.
24
 Found in violation of both regulations, the vessel owner argued 
federal law, namely, the Magnuson Act, preempted the state regulation.
25
 The court 
dismissed this contention and held that section §1856(a), expressly provided regulatory 
authority to the state of Massachusetts over its coastal waters.
26
 
It follows then, that a federally licensed vessel would be subject to the regulatory 
authority of the state merely by transiting state waters to reach adjacent federal waters. 
Regardless, states generally allow passage provided that the vessel does not stop and the 
vessel’s fishing gear is stowed. For example, Rhode Island regulations governing the cod 
fishery state that “vessels in possession of a federal permit allowing the commercial 
harvest of cod may also transit state waters in possession of cod . . . so long as all of the 
fish harvesting gear on board the vessel is stowed while in state waters.”27 Transit 
                                                        
19
 Id. at 705. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 51 Fed. Reg. 23,553 (1986). 
23
 Id. at 23,554. 
24
 971 F.2d 778, 781 (1st Cir. 1992). 
25
 Id. at 785.  
26
 Id. at 786-787. 
27
 25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. § 7.22 (LexisNexis 2013) (Vessels in possession of a federal 
permit allowing the commercial harvest of cod may also transit state waters in possession 
of cod . . . so long as all of the fish harvesting gear on board the vessel is stowed while in 
state waters). 
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allowances are often both species and gear specific. For winter flounder, “fishing 
harvesting gear” that is “stowed” means for a net that is stowed below deck, “it is located 
below the main working deck from which the net is deployed and retrieved, the towing 
wires, including the "leg" wires are detached from the net; and it is fan-folded (flaked) 
and bound around its circumference.”28  
 A federally licensed fishing vessel operator should therefore be cognizant of more 
restrictive Rhode Island regulations if the vessel is to land at a Rhode Island port. While 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held otherwise, the holding appears to be a 
misreading of the law and in contradiction to the suggestive precedent of other courts, the 
plain language of the Magnuson Act, and the Magnuson Act’s implementing regulations. 
Regardless, the same vessel operator may transit across intervening state waters provided 
he abides by the state transit requirements pertaining to the catch on board the vessel. 
 
II. State Permit – Federal Waters  
 
A tangle of state and federal regulations results where federal waters sequester 
areas of state waters that are popular fishing grounds. To illustrate: a fishing vessel 
operating under a Rhode Island permit is perfectly capable of crossing the federal waters 
dividing Block Island Sound with an empty hold in order to reach the state waters around 
Block Island. The legal repercussions begin on the return trip, but largely depend on the 
type of fishing activity. Because of the reciprocity between the United States and Rhode 
Island pertaining to recreational saltwater licenses, the recreational vessel may navigate 
unimpeded back across the federal waters of Block Island Sound to the mainland. 
Commercial vessels operating under a Rhode Island permit have no such luxury. The 
totality of federal commercial fisheries regulations suggests that legal transit of the EEZ 
is impossible without a federal permit.  
Federal regulations pertaining to fishing vessels in the EEZ are a product of 
Fishery Management Plans produced by eight Regional Fishery Management Councils 
for their respective portion of the EEZ and implemented by NOAA Fisheries Service. For 
commercial vessels in Rhode Island, the problematic regulation at issue is 50 C.F.R. § 
648, which governs the federal fisheries of the northeastern United States. An initial 
reading of the regulation suggests that only fishing without a federal permit is prohibited, 
but a further reading of the regulation suggests that simple possession is prohibited as 
well. 
Section 50 C.F.R § 648.14 covers general prohibitions for the fisheries of the 
northeastern United States and declares it is unlawful for a person to: 
 
Possess, import, export, transfer, land, or have custody or control of any 
species of fish regulated pursuant to this [Part 648] that do not meet the 
minimum size provisions in this part, unless such species were harvested 
exclusively within state waters by a vessel not issued a permit under this 
part or whose permit has been surrendered in accordance with applicable 
regulations.
29
 
                                                        
28
 25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. §10.10. 
29
 50 C.F.R. § 648.14(a)(7). 
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This language appears to permit a state licensed vessel to cross the EEZ in violation 
specific federal regulations provided that the vessel fished only in state waters. The 
difficulty here would be for the vessel operator to demonstrate that the species were 
harvested exclusively within state waters. The prohibition section also includes specific 
provisions for vessel and operator permits, which state that it is unlawful for a person to: 
 
Fish for, take, catch, harvest or land any species of fish regulated by this 
part in or from the EEZ, unless the vessel has a valid and appropriate 
permit issued under this part and the permit is on board the vessel and has 
not been surrendered, revoked, or suspended.
30
 
 
Here, there is a federal license requirement for fishing within the EEZ, but no specific 
requirement for possession of a species within the EEZ. Under this provision, a state 
licensed vessel would still be able to cross the EEZ to reach state waters. However, while 
50 C.F.R. §§ 648.14(a)(7) and (b)(1) do not appear to prohibit possession of a species 
without a federal permit, other statutory provisions imply and expressly require that a 
vessel operator possess a federal permit in the EEZ. 
 While the issue is one of possession, federal regulations do not clearly 
differentiate between instances of “fishing” and instances of mere possession. A “fishing 
trip” means “a period of time during which fishing is conducted, beginning when the 
vessel leaves port and ending when the vessel returns to port.”31 Therefore, the fact that 
648.14(b)(1) does not explicitly prohibit possession without a license is moot, because 
“fish for” would include the entirety of the voyage, including the time the vessel’s gear 
was not deployed and the vessel was merely transiting the EEZ. Read in this light, it is 
apparent that both sections 648.14(a)(7) and (b)(1) simply reaffirm the principle that 
states are free to regulate their territorial waters and make no allowances for state 
licensed vessels in federal waters.  
 Federal regulations for specific species support this proposition. For example, the 
North East Multispecies permit, which allows for harvest of a variety of groundfish, is 
expressly required if the vessel is in possession of one of the species within the EEZ. The 
regulation reads: 
 
Except for vessels that have been issued a valid High Seas Fishing 
Compliance permit, have declared their intent to fish, and fish exclusively 
in the NAFO Regulatory Area as provided in § 648.17, any vessel of the 
United States, including a charter or party boat, must have been issued and 
have on board a valid multispecies permit to fish for, possess, or land 
multispecies finfish in or from the EEZ.
32
 
Similarly and for a single species, the requirements for harvest of summer flounder state 
that: 
 
                                                        
30
 50 C.F.R. § 648.14(b)(1). 
31
 50 C.F.R. § 648.2. 
32
 50 C.F.R. § 648.4(a). 
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 Any vessel of the United States that fishes for or retains 
summer flounder in the EEZ must have been issued and 
carry on board a valid summer flounder permit, except for 
vessels other than party or charter vessels that observe the 
possession limit set forth in § 648.106.
33
  
 
For species for which possession is banned under federal law such as Atlantic salmon, it 
is illegal to use any vessel to fish for the species, with the strict presumption that “the 
Atlantic salmon on board were harvested in or from the EEZ, unless the preponderance of 
reliable evidence available indicates otherwise.”34  
 From a recreational standpoint, the issue is whether differences in state and 
federal rules would put recreational fishermen at risk during transits between areas of 
state waters. Unlike state commercial permits, state recreational licenses are often 
afforded reciprocity in federal waters. For instance, Rhode Island’s saltwater recreational 
license, “applies in all offshore federal waters, which extend seaward from the seaward 
edge of all state waters.”35 Moreover, federal regulations state, “a state licensed 
recreational fishing vessel may transit the EEZ provided that “the State's laws and 
regulations are consistent with the fishery management plan and applicable Federal 
fishing regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating.”36 It follows that if 
federal rules pertaining to size season and catch limits are more restrictive than that of the 
state, the vessel cannot legally proceed through the EEZ. In situations where a species is 
closed in federal waters, but open in state waters, the vessel must also defer to the Federal 
regulation. This rule is essentially the reverse of the “most restrictive rule” pertaining to 
federal vessels transiting state waters. 
In Rhode Island, as in much of the northeast, recreational fishermen regularly 
encounter species such as black sea bass, bluefish, cod, haddock, lobster, pollock, scup, 
striped bass, summer flounder, tautog, and weakfish.
37
 Within the federal waters of Block 
Island Sound, a state licensed recreational fishing vessel faces potential liability for 
possession of a species not satisfying federal season, size, possession limits. Currently, 
the only instances federal regulations more restrictive than Rhode Island regulations are 
for possession of black sea bass, scup and winter flounder. While also a potential 
liability, regulations resolved the issue of striped bass as discussed below. 
For black sea bass, federal and Rhode Island size and possession limits are the 
same, but the respective fishing seasons are incongruent. For the EEZ and Rhode Island 
waters, a recreational fisherman is unable to retain a black sea bass less than 13 inches 
                                                        
33
 50 C.F.R. § 648.3(b). 
34
 50 C.F.R. § 648.14(h)(1). 
35
 Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, Division of Fish & Wildlife 
Recreational Saltwater Fishing License Information, available at http://saltwater.ri.gov/ 
(last visited February 1, 2013). 
36
 16 U.S.C.S 1856(a)(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2013). 
37
 A chart including every species is attached below. 
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and can posses up to 15 fish per person.
38
 The federal season runs from January 1
st
 to the 
end of February, and then from May 19
th
 to October 14
th
, and from November 1
st
 to 
December 31
st
.
39
 The state season runs from June 15
th
 to December 31
st
. A Rhode Island 
recreational fisherman would therefore be unable to cross the EEZ from Block Island 
from October 14
th
 to November 1
st
. For scup, Rhode Island catch limits increase from 20 
per person between May 1
st
 and August 31
st
 to 40 per person between September 1
st
 and 
October 31
st
. During the 40 per person time period, a recreational fisherman is in 
violation of the federal regulation mandating a 20 per person catch limit for the entire 
year.
40
  
For winter flounder, federal possession is banned south and east of Cape Cod, 
while Rhode Island permits possession of 2 flounder per person of 12 or more inches in 
most areas below Narragansett Bay.
41
 Possession of winter flounder within the EEZ by a 
Rhode Island recreational fisherman would therefore be banned.  
While federal regulations ban possession of striped bass in federal waters as well, 
an exception makes an allowance for possession within the EEZ surrounding the waters 
of Block Island. This possession exception arose out of a showing that the enforcement of 
the no possession rule was unduly onerous, difficult to enforce, and that state licensed 
vessels had no choice but to traverse the EEZ. The striped bass exception appears to be a 
workable solution to the issue of difficulties in regulatory compliance while transiting 
federal waters, but the length of the process involved suggests that attempting the same 
on a per species basis may not be the most efficient solution to compliance issues.  
 For striped bass, taking, retaining, or possessing a federally protected species in 
federal waters is illegal under federal rules meant to conserve the species.
42
 In 1989 
NOAA Fisheries solicited public comment on options presented to regulate fishing for 
striped bass in the EEZ on the Atlantic Coast.
43
 NOAA posited four options: (1) 
prohibition on the harvest and the possession of striped bass in the EEZ; (2) prohibition 
on the harvest of striped bass in the EEZ; (3) application of state regulations to fish 
caught in the EEZ; and (4) status quo or take no action.
44
  
NOAA Fisheries’ proposed rule prohibited a person to “Possess any Atlantic 
striped bass on board a fishing vessel while such vessel is engaged in fishing within the 
                                                        
38
 50 C.F.R. § 648.145(a) (2013) (Black sea bass Possession Limit); 50 C.F.R. § 648.147 
(2013) (Black Sea bass Minimum fish sizes); 25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. §7.14.2 (Black Sea 
Bass Recreational Harvest).    
39
 50 C.F.R. § 648.146 (2013) (Black sea bass Recreational Fishing Season); 25-8-4 R.I. 
CODE R. §7.14.2-2 (Recreational Season).    
40
 50 C.F.R. § 648.128(a) (2013) (Scup Possession Restrictions); 50 C.F.R. § 648.127 
(2013) (Scup Recreational Fishing Season).  
41
 50 C.F.R. § 648.86 (2013) (NE Multispecies Possession Restrictions); 50 C.F.R. § 
648.81 (2013) (NE Multispecies Closed Areas); 25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. §7.8 (Winter 
Flounder Recreational Regulations).  
42
 Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 5151-5158 (LexisNexis 2013). 
43
 Atlantic Coast Striped Bass Regulations in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 54 Fed. Reg. 
33735 (August 16, 1989) (Advance notice of proposed rulemaking). 
44
 Id. 
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EEZ.”45 In a public comment to the rule, both the New England Fisheries Management 
Council (NEFMC) favored Option 4, noting the need to transport Atlantic striped bass 
that were legally taken in state waters through the EEZ (such as in the waters of Block 
Island Sound).
46
 Disregarding NEFMC’s objection, NOAA Fisheries decided that an 
outright ban with no exceptions was more practicable.
47
 
The Mid Atlantic Fisheries Management Council supported the proposed rule, but 
suggested that possession of Atlantic striped bass on a vessel in the EEZ while the vessel 
is not engaged in fishing be allowed only in the area between Block Island and the Rhode 
Island mainland.
48
 The Coast Guard commented that prohibiting possession would be 
very difficult to enforce and suggested that possession of Atlantic striped bass be 
prohibited on a vessel unless that vessel is in continuous transit from one location in state 
waters to another location in state waters.
49
 In response, NOAA limited the exception to 
the Rhode Island area because the only location where a fisherman can take Atlantic 
striped bass legally in state waters and must traverse the EEZ en route to the mainland is 
Block Island, Rhode Island.
50
 The Prohibitions and Block Island Sound area exceptions 
were consolidated and clarified in 1996.
51
 There, NMFS consolidated regulations 
pertaining to the Atlantic striped bass and weakfish fisheries, which were contained in 
two C.F.R. parts, into a single part.
52
 In a final action, NMFS responded to U.S. Coast 
Guard suggestions to clarify current language and address enforcement issues by defining 
the Block Island Sound Area through GPS coordinates.
53
 
 All told, it took 7 years for the NMFS to construct an exception to allow 
possession of striped bass by recreational fishermen in a small area of the EEZ, provided 
the vessel remained in continuous transit. The difficulty in applying an exception such as 
this on a per species basis is not only the time involved, but also the regularity of which 
state and federal fisheries regulations can change. Constant change means updating 
transiting exceptions on a per species basis becomes a continuous and needless burden; 
therefore the “striped bass exception” is likely not the model for which to base any future 
exceptions unless the exception contains a broader base more able to withstand future 
changes. 
 Regardless, the current state of affairs for recreational fishermen is that when 
fishing vessels have no choice but to cross federal waters in order to return to port with 
their catch, federal regulations distinguish between commercial and recreational vessels. 
                                                        
45
 Id.  
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Atlantic Striped Bass Fishery, 55 Fed. Reg. 40181 (October 2, 1990) (Final Rule, 50 
C.F.R. 656). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Atlantic Striped Bass Fishery; Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management; 
Consolidation and Revision of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 29321 (June, 10, 1996) (50 
C.F.R. §§ 656, 697). 
52
 Id. 
53
 Atlantic Coast Weakfish Fishery; Change in Regulations for the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, 62 Fed. Reg. 24921 (September, 22, 1997) (50 C.F.R. § 697). 
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Commercial vessels are unable to transit federal waters due to permit requirements 
whereas recreational vessels may transit provided federal regulations are not more 
restrictive than those of the state. While individual transit provisions aid recreational 
vessels where a species is heavily regulated under federal law, drafting individual 
provisions for all the instances where federal regulations are more restrictive would be an 
inefficient solution to this complex problem.   
 
III. Extensions of State Fisheries Jurisdiction 
 
Complex coastlines result in incongruous fisheries management schemes likely to 
confuse and frustrate fishing vessel operators. One solution to this problem is to allow for 
allows for state management of fisheries in federal waters in instances where state waters 
nearly or totally encompass federal waters. This part of the paper discusses the 
“Nantucket Sound exception” contained within the language of the Magnuson Act, which 
allows Massachusetts to exert fisheries jurisdiction over the whole of the Sound. This part 
of the paper then discusses the applicability of the Nantucket Sound Exception to the case 
of Rhode Island, which has a similar opportunity to enclose the federal waters of Block 
Island Sound for the purpose of establishing state fisheries jurisdiction.  
Nantucket and Vineyard Sounds are subject to the fisheries jurisdiction of 
Massachusetts under the Magnuson Act.
54
 The Magnuson Act expressly authorizes 
Massachusetts' exercise of regulatory authority over the harvesting and at-sea processing 
of fish in Nantucket and Vineyard Sounds.
55
 Pursuant to the Magnuson Act, “The 
jurisdiction and authority of a state shall extend . . . with respect to the body of water 
commonly known as Nantucket Sound, to the pocket of water west of the seventieth 
meridian west of Greenwich.”56 This extension of jurisdiction arose to address the limited 
situations where federal waters were entirely surrounded by state waters.
57
 Addressing 
these limited situations, Congress allowed for the extension of state jurisdiction because 
“the presence of these pockets creates incongruous fishery management schemes and 
presents significant problems in the area of fisheries law enforcement.”58 While 
Nantucket Sound is not entirely enclosed by the territorial sea of Massachusetts, it creates 
the same fisheries management problems that §1856 of the Magnuson Act alleviates.
59
 
Rhode Island could seek enclose Block Island Sound for the purpose of fisheries 
jurisdiction as a result of the same fisheries management problems Massachusetts faced. 
On the face of the statute, Block Island Sound is not a candidate for exemption under 16 
U.S.C. § 1856(a), which applies to “any pocket of waters that is adjacent to the State and 
totally enclosed by lines delimiting the territorial sea…”60 However, like Nantucket 
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Sound, Block Island Sound creates “incongruous fishery management schemes and 
presents significant problems in the area of fisheries law enforcement,” the situation for 
which Congress designed the section.
61
 
While Block Island Sound is similar to Nantucket Sound in that the federal waters 
are not entirely enclosed, Block Island Sound is open in to the greater federal waters in 
two different locations rather than one. This makes an argument for expanded state 
jurisdiction more persuasive because vessels fishing in state waters off of Nantucket 
Island could conceivably take a “great circle” route around the bay until it reached 
Chatham Harbor, the whole time avoiding entering federal water. Here, vessels fishing 
off of Block Island must traverse the EEZ en route to the mainland. In this way, partial 
enclosure of federal waters by those of the state presents greater difficulties for fishermen 
than do nearly or totally enclosed state waters. 
Unlike the Nantucket Sound Exception, H.R. 3906 (To Amend the Atlantic 
Striped Bass Conservation Act) sought to extend Rhode Island fisheries jurisdiction over 
federal waters for a single species. Here, it would appear that any extension of 
jurisdiction for a single species would have to demonstrate that modification of current 
no possession requirements are insufficient, that enclosure is consistent with federal 
management and conservation issues and that enclosure would not undermine regulatory 
efforts in other states. 
Modification of no-possession requirements is sufficient for the area of federal 
waters lying between Block Island and the mainland (“Block Island Transit Zone”). The 
Striped Bass Management Board of the ASMFC and the New England Fishery 
Management Council noted in 1990 the need to transport Atlantic striped bass legally 
taken in state waters through the EEZ where possession was illegal. The proposed rule
62
 
accommodated this by allowing a recreational vessel to transport Atlantic striped bass 
through the EEZ, provided that person does not engage in fishing while in the EEZ.
63
 
H.R. 3906 is also inconsistent with current management principles, executive 
orders, and could undermine regulatory efforts in other states.
64
 In 1990, NMFS 
implemented a federal ban on the harvest and possession of striped bass. In 2006, NMFS 
reanalyzed potential effects of opening the EEZ to Atlantic striped bass harvest and 
received overwhelming support for continuation of the ban. In 2007, an Executive Order 
affirmed as policy of the United States the goal of conserving striped bass and NMFS 
determined that the current prohibition on fishing for striped bass in the EEZ was 
consistent with the executive order.
65
 Critics argue that granting exceptions to the rule 
will give way to further exceptions in other states, rendering piecemeal the overall federal 
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conservation effort detailed above.
66
 Finally, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Commission (ASMFC) is cautious about expansion of harvesting opportunity, such as 
opening federal waters, without an analysis of the impacts on the overall harvest and the 
stock status. In a hearing on H.R. 3906, the ASMFC stated, “given the choice between 
the painful measures taken to rebuild the fishery or regulatory adjustments to sustain a 
stock at a sustainable level of biomass, our states choose the latter.”67 
A wholesale extension of Rhode Island fisheries jurisdiction over the waters of 
Block Island Sound appears more likely to be successful than a piecemeal approach. Such 
extensions have already proven successful in Massachusetts, are based on federal law, 
address a specific problem and avoid concerns over the breakdown of uniform 
applicability of federal fisheries regulations. 
 
IV. Extensions of State Sovereignty 
 
While Massachusetts resolved the issue of excessively intervening federal waters 
within Nantucket Sound through an extension of state fisheries jurisdiction, New York 
accomplished the same in Long Island Sound through an extension of sovereignty. Where 
federal waters excessively intervene upon those of a state, annexation of the federal 
waters is proper only when the state demonstrates that the body of water satisfies the 
statutory, treaty, and jurisprudential requirements for annexation. While Block Island 
fulfills the definition of a juridical bay under the Submerged Lands Act and Article 7 of 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958 
Convention), current Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that Block Island Sound 
would not be enclosed as a juridical bay. 
Under the 1958 Convention, a bay is a “well-marked indentation” that is “more 
than a mere curvature of the coast;” the area of which area is “as large as, or larger than 
that of a semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation” 
and where islands divide the mouth of the indentation, the semi-circle is “drawn on a line 
as long as the [sum] of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths.”68  
However, the Supreme Court has held that nothing in the 1958 Convention or in 
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 indicates whether islands may be treated as extensions 
of the mainland for the purpose of forming a headland of a juridical bay. 
69
 In some 
circumstances, an island or group of islands may be considered part of the mainland and 
therefore treated as headlands if they are so integrally related to the mainland that they 
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are realistically parts of the coast within the meaning of the 1958 Convention.
70
 Whether 
a particular island is treated as part of the mainland depends size, distance from the 
mainland, depth and utility of the intervening waters, shape of the island, and relationship 
to the configuration or curvature of the coast.
71
 An island's "origin and resultant 
connection with the shore" is also considered.
72
 
The 1958 Convention is the applicable law in all disputes between the United 
States and the individual states in regard to coastal boundaries.
73 
In U.S. v. California, the 
Court held that “the meaning of ‘inland waters’ in the Submerged Lands Act should 
conform to the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.”74 The 
Submerged Lands Act gives control over the water and submerged land resources within 
three miles of the baseline to each individual coastal state.
75
 Taken together, the 
Submerged Lands Act grants states territorial waters extending three nautical miles, the 
baseline for which depends on the interpretation of the 1958 Convention.  
The 1958 Convention contains both a subjective and objective test for juridical 
bays. The objective test provides a straightforward mathematical formula while the 
subjective test requires a determination of whether the indentation in the coast is 
sufficiently bay-like. This subjective determination acts as a roadblock to most claims 
raised by states, as the Supreme Court and its special masters confront complex 
geography deemed insufficiently bay-like, resulting in a growing body of factors used to 
determine whether an indentation that otherwise meets the objective test is actually a 
bay.
76
 In the matter of Rhode Island’s Block Island Sound, the Supreme Court held that 
despite meeting the objective requirement of Article 7, Block Island could not be treated 
as an “extension of the mainland” and thus could not be as headlands of a juridical bay.77 
The holding remains fundamentally at odds with Article 7, which accounts for the 
geography of Rhode Island and New York. 
Article 7 of the 1958 Convention requires a bay to be a “well marked 
indentation.” Here, the coastline of the mainland of Rhode Island, Connecticut and New 
York would otherwise fail Article 7’s requirement. However, the drafters of the 1958 
convention intended to include indentations created in part by islands to be included as 
juridical bays under Article 7, which includes an “indentation which, if it had no islands 
at its mouth, would not fulfill the necessary conditions, is to be recognized as a bay. 
Given this allowance for bays formed in part by islands, Long Island and Block Island 
create a well-marked indentation that when taken together with the mainland, forms a 
well-marked indentation. 
Contrary to the 1958 Convention, the Supreme Court held in the U.S v. Maine 
that “the Convention addresses the problems created by islands located at the mouth of a 
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bay, but does not address the analytically different problem whether islands may be 
treated as part of the mainland to form an indentation.”78 Instead, an island or group of 
islands may be considered part of the mainland if they are so integrally related to the 
mainland that they are realistically parts of the "coast" within the meaning of the 1958 
Convention.
79
 Applying this standard, the Court deemed Long Island so integrally related 
to the coast that it could be “assimilated to the mainland.”80 In doing so, the Court cited 
the proximity of Long Island to the mainland at its western-most tip, the shallowness and 
inutility of the intervening waters, the fact that the East River is not an opening to the sea, 
[as well as] common geological history, formed by deposits of sediment and rocks 
brought from the mainland by retreating glaciers.
81
 In contrast, Block Island lacked 
proximity to the mainland and lay outside what was otherwise a proper closing line 
running north from Montauk Point. 
Despite the Court’s disregard of Article 7, Block Island should have succeeded 
under the “assimilation of the islands to the mainland test.” Like Long Island, Block 
Island shares a common geological history with the mainland. Both islands formed what 
was once a continuous piece of land that contained a large freshwater lake.
82
 As glaciers 
retreated, a major water gap formed between Long Island and Block Island and flowed 
toward the sea.
83
 Later, sea currents widened the gap between the islands as sea levels 
rose, resulting in the current geological formations.
84
 Additionally, commercial vessels 
rarely go between Montauk Point and Block Island because of the hazardous underwater 
conditions there and often use Block Island Sound as a refuge because of the calmer 
waters there.
85
 Despite these conditions and despite what appears to be an allowance by 
the drafters of the 1958 Convention, it seems that solely due to Block Island’s greater 
distance from the mainland, Block Island Sound did not pass the Court’s subjective 
interpretation of a “well marked indentation.” 
Article 7 also requires a bay to be “as large or greater than the area semi-circle 
with a diameter equal to the closing lines across the mouths of the bay.” Here, the first 
closing line measures from Montauk Point to a point near Southwest point on Block 
Island. The second closing line measures from Sandy Point on Block Island to Point 
Judith on the Rhode Island Mainland. The total distance is approximately 22 miles.
86
 A 
semi-circle with a diameter of 22 miles has an area of approximately 190 miles. Long 
Island Sound measures 1,320 sq. miles and Block Island Sound measures 250 sq. miles.
87
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The bay constituting the two sounds measures 1,570 sq. miles, which is greater than the 
required 190 miles and so satisfies the Article 7 test. Here, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that under this test alone, Block Island Sound constitutes a juridical bay.
88
 
The issue therefore came down to the proper application of the more subjective 
requirements of Article 7, noted above. 
The drafters of Article 7 also intended to account for the presence of islands 
across the mouth of the indentation, even though the closing line would, without the 
island, exceed the distance requirements laid out above. The drafters note that “Here, the 
Commission's intention was to indicate that the presence of islands at the entrance to an 
indentation links it [the indentation] more closely with the territory, which may justify 
some alteration of the proportion between the length and depth of the indentation.”89  
Despite this, the Supreme Court claimed, “such a treatment of islands beyond the natural 
entrance points of an indentation finds no support in the Convention or in any of the 
scholarly treatises.”90 In discounting such islands, the Court held that the island should be 
“close enough at all points to provide [a seaman] with shelter from all but that one 
direction.”91 In this way Block Island Sound fails the test for a juridical bay on the 
Supreme Court’s theory that it will not treat islands deemed well beyond the natural 
entrance points of an indentation as creating multiple mouths to that indentation.
92
 
The Supreme Court’s sentiment that Block Island is too far removed from the 
coast to constitute the headlands of a bay does not seem related to the statutory 
requirements for designating a state’s internal and territorial waters. By the Court’s own 
admission, the interplay between the Submerged Lands Act and the 1958 convention 
should define a state’s territorial waters.  Allowing for the enclosure of Long Island 
Sound while forbidding the same for Block Island Sound, regardless of the fact that both 
bodies of water satisfy the requirements, needlessly complicates fisheries regulatory 
compliance and enforcement both for Rhode Island and the federal government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rhode Island’s issue of excessively intervening federal waters within Block 
Island Sound remains while neighboring bodies of water display a variety of solutions 
that have resolved the very same fisheries jurisdictional issues arising from complex 
territorial waters. Past efforts to assert state sovereignty over intervening federal waters 
have failed and more recent efforts to assert at least some state fisheries jurisdiction over 
federal waters never got off the ground. As a result, the current state of affairs remains a 
maze of competing and superseding federal and state fisheries regulations. Vessels 
operating under federal permits must either abide by more restrictive state regulations or 
may challenge the state regulation under the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s outlying 
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preemption jurisprudence. State permitted recreational fishing vessels may transit the 
federal waters of Block Island Sound provided that the catch on board satisfies federal 
regulations more restrictive than those of the state or is exempted from federal regulation. 
Commercial vessels wishing to do the same are left out in the cold. While seemingly 
unique to Rhode Island, the same competition between federal and state regulation exists 
wherever islands sit greater than six miles offshore.  
  
 
  
 
 
